Today, mobile users are intensively interconnected thanks to the emerging mobile social networks, where they share location-based information with each other when traveling on different routes and visit different areas of the city. In our model, the information collected is aggregated over all users' trips and made publicly available as a public good. Due to information overlap, the total useful content amount increases with the diversity in path choices made by the users, and it is crucial to motivate selfish users to choose different paths, despite the potentially higher costs associated with their trips. In this paper, we combine the benefits from social information sharing with the fundamental routing problem where a unit mass of non-atomic selfish users decides their trips in a non-cooperative game by choosing between a high-cost and a low-cost path. To remedy the inefficient low-content equilibrium where all users choose to explore a single path (the low-cost path), we propose and analyze two new incentive mechanisms that can be used by the social network application, one based on side payments and the other on restricting access to content for users that choose the low cost path. Under asymmetric information about user types (their valuations for content quality), both mechanisms efficiently penalize the participants that use the low-cost path and reward the participants that take the high-cost path. They lead to greater path diversity and hence to more total available content at the social cost of reduced user participation or restricted content to part of the users. We show that user heterogeneity can have opposite effects on social efficiency depending on the mechanism used. We also obtain interesting price of anarchy results that show some fundamental tradeoffs between achieving path diversity and maintaining greater user participation, motivating a combined mechanism to further increase the social welfare. Our model extends classical dynamic routing in the case of externalities caused from traffic on different paths of the network.
I. INTRODUCTION
E MERGING mobile social networks are developing fast to strengthen mobile users' social ties and allow them to share useful location-based information with others. The information is usually aggregated over all users' trips and made publicly available to benefit all users that participate. The shared information (e.g., about shopping promotions and locations, restaurant discovery, air quality, traffic conditions, etc.) Manuscript weigh heavily on users' daily life, and is considered a public good that benefits all. Plenty of such information sharing applications (e.g., TripAdvisor and Yelp) 1 have been proposed to involve millions of mobile users, and the revenue of the related location-based services is expected to increase to around US$40 billions by 2019 [1] . For example, Microsoft has recruited workers through Gigwalk, a famous mobile platform, to photograph 3D panoramas of businesses and restaurants, which are integrated to Bing Maps data [2] . Another example is that to collect air quality data, mobile participatory sensing systems are developed that request participants to choose diverse routes to sense [3] . Social information sharing via mobile routing and sensing comes at a cost to the mobile users. Travelling on a path generally incurs a travel cost, e.g., cost of time and gas to a user. When making routing decisions to sense information, users are selfish and may only choose the routes with such minimum costs. Hence, incentive mechanisms are crucial for inducing larger participation and motivating individuals to perform diverse routing and sensing tasks that are more valuable to the community. Such mechanisms, designed by a "social planner", must consider the various costs and benefits related to the potential information collected by the participants. Prior routing game literature did not study any social benefit from information sharing among users, but only looked at users' travel costs (e.g., congestion generated by users on the same route) for equilibrium routing analysis. The prior literature mainly used concepts like Nash equilibrium for bestresponse users or Wardrop equilibrium for non-atomic users (e.g., [4] - [7] ), and analyzed price of anarchy under different pricing schemes to control congestion. Differently, this paper studies how to regulate dynamic routing that includes not only the travel costs along the paths but also the benefit users get from the shared information collected along all paths. Hence, our model extends in a fundamental way the traditional dynamic routing setup to include the positive externalities generated by users traveling on different paths: a user traveling on one path benefits from the content collected by users traveling on another path.
We also note that this paper is different from the recent mobile crowdsensing studies (e.g., [3] , [8] - [11] ), which focused on the analysis of participation incentives via auction, contract or pricing in a principal-agent structure under asymmetric information. In our model users are non-atomic, and while travelling they collect information that is useful to all, acting as both information contributors and consumers. Borrowing concepts from standard public good models (e.g., [12] , [13] ), our model combines information sharing with routing decision incentives to collect information from different routes when this has a high informational value to the community. Our aim is to design optimal incentive mechanisms for heterogeneous users to use paths with potentially higher costs in order to increase the level of public good provisioning, i.e., the diversity and value of information available to the community.
Our basic content sharing model starts with a single path. Participants using this path collect information that is aggregated by the system planner in a sub-additive way (due to possible information overlaps), and made available to the community as a public good with controlled access. The valuation of this public good may depend on a user's type that is private information. Under asymmetric information, the social planner knows the fraction of users in each type but cannot distinguish between individual users. In the case of multiple paths, information collected from different paths is independent, and hence the same number of users traveling over different paths generates more total content compared to traveling over a single path.
As shown in Fig. 1 , our network routing model is the simplest possible involving only two paths (similar to the fundamental routing problem in [7] ): H with some nonzero high cost, and L with low cost, for simplicity equal to zero. Though simple, this network model captures users' heterogeneity in travel cost and content valuation, and allows us to explain intuitively and clearly the loss of efficiency due to users' private information that various incentive policies exhibit. Adding a non-linear congestion cost term in each path does not change the qualitative properties of our equilibrium results, but makes the analysis unnecessarily more complex.
We analyse a non-cooperative game where a unit mass of selfish non-atomic users must decide their trips by choosing between the two paths. Our model extends traditional routing game models (e.g., [4] - [6] ) by considering both the costs of the trips and the information value obtained by having access to the total amount of collected content. Each user has a "type" regarding her valuation for content: how much she benefits from the content collected (per unit), or equivalently, in the case of using an application processing this content, how the quality of the calculations depend on the amount of content made available. Now, each user obtains a net utility that is proportional to her type (defined above) multiplied by the total amount of content collected, minus her travel cost. Without any incentive, since each non-atomic user's content contribution is infinitesimal compared to the total amount of content collected, the only equilibrium is for all users to take the low-cost path. However, the social optimum in general can involve a fraction of users taking the high-cost path to increase significantly path diversity and hence total content available, even if this is more costly.
For this system we address the problem of constructing incentive mechanisms for motivating the optimal fraction of users to take the high-cost path, achieving the best possible tradeoff between travel cost and content value. Our benchmark for evaluating social efficiency is the centralized model where the social planner dictates the optimal routing actions for all the users. We analyse the properties of two individually rational, incentive compatible and budget balanced incentive mechanisms, one using side payments and the other restricting access to content. Side payments are collected from users choosing the low-cost path and create subsidies to users that take the high-cost path, to keep the budget balanced. We expect such a mechanism to be implemented by the content sharing social network application; for example, by reducing membership fees to users that take the high-cost path.
Content-restriction is implemented by controlling the fraction a < 1 of the content made accessible to users that take the low-cost path (same as "destroying" a fraction 1 − a of the content being collected), and does not require a billing system as side-payment does. Both schemes penalise directly or indirectly the users that choose the low-cost path and reward the users that take the high-cost path. We capture the important trade-off between achieving greater path diversity at the expense of lower user participation or higher content destruction, and show that higher user diversity in their valuation for content can have opposite effects in the two mechanisms.
Though simple, this network model captures heterogeneity (i) of paths in travel cost and (ii) of users in content valuation. It shows the loss of efficiency due to users' private information that reduces the capabilities of the social planner (application) to control routing decisions.
Our main findings are summarised as follows.
• Side payments inflict the same cost/benefit to all user independently of their types and there is a tension between raising the cost for users choosing the lowcost path and violating the participation condition of low valuation users. It turns out that when users have homogeneous valuations for content, side payments don't suffer from this participation issue and achieve social optimality (with price of anarchy (Po A) equal to 1), while when users have diverse content valuations, under the optimum incentive scheme users of low-valuation type may not participate, reducing efficiency and Po A to 1/2 from the social optimum where the social planner has full power. • By restricting content, users who value content more have a stronger incentive to take the high-cost path. This incentive scheme affects more the high-valuation user type, even if this is private information. Contrary to the side-payment case mentioned earlier, user diversity improves performance since high valuation type users may be willing to move to the H path even if information restriction is low on the L path. Hence under some conditions on user type distribution, content restriction can be more efficient than side payments. Again, it achieves a Po A 1/2. • Combining the two incentive schemes produces strictly better results than using any single one. Applying a degree of content restriction reduces the amount of side payments needed to induce path diversity, hence increasing low-valuation users' participation. We show that the Po A is beyond 0.7. • Robustness of the results concerning the two incentive schemes is shown by extending our model to a more general network model including more than two paths and with possible path overlap. We successfully address the new challenges of these models including multiple and unstable equilibria in the optimal incentive design. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the system model combining information sharing with routing. Sections III and IV present and analyze the two kinds of mechanisms. Section V shows the combined mechanism. Section VI shows simulation results. Section VII analyzes a more general network model and Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
When a user travels, she continuously senses information that is useful for the user community. This information is aggregated over all users and offered back to the user community as a public good. We consider the network model from source node s to destination node t in Fig. 1 , where there are two paths from the set P := {H, L}. Though simple, the twopath network model still captures all the interesting aspects of incentive-based routing policies in a clear and educational way. A more general network with multiple paths and path overlap is further analyzed in Section VII.
Travelling on the H -path (L-path) incurs a travel cost, e.g., cost of time and gas, c H (c L ) to a user, where c H > c L . For simplicity, we normalize these costs so that c H > 0 and c L = 0. Such costs are determined by well-known exogenous factors like traveling distance, average congestion during time of travel, and quality of road surface, which are therefore common for all users. Note that the travel costs per user are fixed and do not depend on the amount of traffic along the paths. This is sensible if our system users (e.g., in Gigwalk) represent a small fraction of the total population that travels. We have extended our analysis to the case of linear congestion costs where the travel costs depend in a linear way on the amount of traffic along each path, see [14] . Our key results remain the same although the analysis and the presentation of the results become significantly more complicated.
Given the two path candidates H -path and L-path, we except a large number n of users that make selfish routing decisions in a one-shot game. Since n is assumed large for routing, we reasonably consider an individual user to be nonatomic as in most of the routing game literature (e.g., [4] - [6] ), and model our n users by a single infinitely divisible unit mass of non-atomic users. In this one-shot game, each user chooses a path P ∈ P . We denote by x H the fraction of the users that choose the H -path, leaving 1 − x H to use the L-path.
Users obtain a net benefit that is determined by travel costs and the information collected. To model this information value we need to define an information or content model, i.e., how different user routing decisions affect the total information collected. We present now a specific model for information collection that motivates the general properties that such information collection models should possess.
For simplicity, we model the total information available in the network as a set of N different information pieces uniformly distributed along the two paths, i.e., each path has N/2 independent information pieces with no information overlap between paths. 2 Since paths are symmetric in term of available information, we denote by 3 Q 1 (x) the expected number of independent pieces of information collected over an arbitrary path if (i) a fraction x of the n users (or a mass 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 among the total unit mass of users) travel over that path, (ii) each user collects φ distinct information pieces among the N/2 available, and (iii) each user selects her information items independently of other users. In this model each information piece has probability φ/(N/2) to be sensed by a given user, and probability 1−(1−φ/(N/2)) nx to be sensed by at least one among the nx users. Hence, the total average number of items sensed by our nx users (the average "information content") on this single link is
which is concave and increasing in x. Similarly, the information value on the other path is Q 1 (1 − x) since n(1 − x) users will take this second path. We denote by Q(x, 1) the total information content collected and aggregated from both paths when a fraction x of the total unit mass of users choose one of the paths, which is given by
This is concavely increasing in x when 0 ≤ x ≤ 0.5 and decreasing when 0.5 < x ≤ 1. As not all users may participate, we may extend this notation and denote by
where the total information content obtained if a mass x out of a total of b chooses one of the paths (hence b − x chooses the other path). Hence, b is the active participation fraction among users and the shape of our content function depends on the richness of the content (value of N) and the actual member of users that are abstracted into a continuous mass. The above example motivates the properties of more general information content functions Q(x, 1) that are based on different forms of the Q 1 (x) function. We require that Q(x, 1): (i) is increasing and concave for 0 ≤ x ≤ 0.5, and (ii) Q(x, 1) = Q(1 − x, 1). This implies that creating a more balanced traffic in the two links increases the total sensed information. Our results in the later sections do not depend on the specific model in (1), assuming any general (but "sensible") model of information content mentioned above.
In the rest of the paper we use the H -path as the reference path, corresponding to the use of x = x H in the above formulas. Hence, Q(x H , 1) is the total content available assuming that x H traffic goes through the H -path.
We next address that users may have different valuations for content, i.e., have different sensitivities to the total amount of content Q(x H , 1) made available. For example, a user might have little use of the total content or require a small fraction of this content (equivalently, care less about the quality of the service provided by the application). We model this by a multiplicative parameter θ . To make our analysis simpler, we consider two valuation types among users, 4 denoted by θ 1 and θ 2 , where θ 1 ≤ θ 2 . An important parameter of the model is the average valuation θ 0 given by
where η and 1 − η are the user proportions in low and high valuations respectively. We assume that user types are private information (i.e., only a user knows its type θ i ) and that the system only knows the value of η (i.e., the fraction of each type in the total population). If a user with type i ∈ {1, 2} chooses path P ∈ {H, L}, her payoff is the difference between her perceived information value θ i Q(x H , 1) and the travel cost on path P. 5 That is,
and the user will prefer the path with a higher payoff. We could consider a concave utility function of the information Q to reflect diminishing margin gains and make our model more general. Actually, as the content function Q is already concave in the H-path flow x, the utility function will still be some concave function of x. When we do the social welfare maximization and PoA analysis below, we will consider an arbitrary concave information function Q of x, and this could very well be the composition of our given utility function with some other concave content function.
Observe that in our non-atomic user model an individual user has an infinitesimal contribution to Q(x H , 1), thus her perceived information value θ i Q(x H , 1) is not affected by her path choice P. But it depends on the choices made by the rest of the users through the value of x H . We naturally formulate such interaction among users in path choosing as a content routing game. We denote a feasible flow's path partition by (x H , 1 − x H ), or just by x H since the flow on the L-path follows uniquely from x H . The next definition is the equivalent of a Wardrop equilibrium (we place a hat over a symbol to denote equilibrium flow).
Definition 1: A feasible flowx H in the content routing game is an equilibrium if no user traveling over the H -path or the L-path will profit by deviating from her current path choice to increase her payoff.
The social welfare (total system efficiency) is defined as
If we can perfectly control all users' decisions in a centralized way, we can achieve the social optimum flow x * H that maximises SW (x H ) in (6) without any constraint:
(We use superscript * to denote optimal values). It is easy to see that x * H ∈ [0, 0.5], otherwise we can replace it by 1 − x * H to achieve the same information value in (2) at a smaller total cost on the H -path.
A. Equilibrium Without Incentive Design
In real world users are selfish and may not behave optimally without appropriate incentives. We now analyse the users' behavior in the content routing game without any added incentives using the standard notion of a Wardrop equilibrium. Notice no matter which path a user of type-i chooses, the information value she perceived is always θ i Q(x H , 1) according to (5) and hence her choice only depends on path cost. Therefore, the selfish routing strategy is for every user to choose the L-path at the equilibrium.
Proposition 1: There exists a unique equilibrium for our content routing game:x H = 0 and the resultant social welfare is SW (0) = θ 0 Q(0, 1).
There is a gap between optimal social welfare and the social welfare attained at the above equilibrium. We measure the gap by price of anarchy (Po A) [15] , which is the ratio between the lowest social welfare at any equilibrium and the optimal social welfare SW (x * H ), by searching over all possible system parameters and Q(·, 1) functions. In our content routing game, the specific formula of Po A without any added incentives is
.
Proposition 2:
The price of anarchy of the content routing game without incentive design is Po A = 1/2.
The proof is given in Appendix A. The H -path cost c H > 0 motivates all users to take the L-path and leads to the inefficient equilibrium. Hence a sufficiently small but positive cost leads to the biggest loss of efficiency, as the equilibrium ignores completely the content on the H -path. Realizing the inefficiency, we want to design incentive mechanisms to approach social optimum SW (x * H ) with the following properties.
1) Individual rationality (IR): The payoff of each H -or L-path participant should be non-negative to guarantee participation. users (if any) should be distributed to the rest of the users. Many information sharing platforms want to maximize the social welfare and are not profitable in forming a community among users. We will introduce in the following sections two incentive schemes which satisfy the above properties: side-payment and content-restriction.
We list all the key notations used in this paper in Table I .
III. SIDE PAYMENTS AS INCENTIVE
The idea of using side-payment as an incentive is to incentivise more users to choose H -path by charging more users that take the L-path (and providing positive subsidies to users of the H -path). When applying side-payment (on the L-path), it is possible that some users with low-valuation type θ 1 ("low valuation users") may choose not to participate, since their payoffs can be negative. In this case, only a proportion b ≤ 1 of the unit mass of users will participate. To address this reduction of the total mass of users in the system we use the content definition in (3) . We can now formally introduce the side-payment mechanism as follows.
A. Side-Payment Mechanism
We charge an extra cost g(x H ) on each of (b − x H )n L-path participants and refund an amount (b − x H )g(x H )/x H equally to each among the nx H H -path participants to keep the budget balanced. 6 Our side-payment mechanism only depends on a user's path choice instead of her private type, and will ensure IC. This side-payment mechanism requires a billing system (e.g., Amazon Mechanical Turk) to enable monetary transfer between users. As long as users want to access the public information, they need to accept this mechanism's policy and use the billing system. In Section IV, we will introduce another incentive mechanism based on content-restriction, which does not require such a billing system.
After introducing the side-payment mechanism, the payoffs of users change. Depending on her path choice (H or L), a user of type i ∈ {1, 2} will receive a refund (b − x H ) g(x H )/x H or have to submit payment g(x H ). Her payoff changes from (5) to
Consider any positive equilibriumx H > 0. A type-i user's payoff difference between taking the H and L paths is zero when
which does not depend on its type. Hence in order to have a positive flow on both paths we need the above incentive difference to be zero, i.e., the payment function g must satisfy
We say an equilibrium is asymptotically stable [16] if a small perturbation of the traffic on the two links, say adding (subtracting) small to the H -path and subtracting (adding) the from L-path, does not move the system away from the equilibrium. Stability is an important criterion for an equilibrium to be implementable, thus we only consider stable equilibria in this paper. We say that we can incentivise (as an equilibrium) the flow valuex H ifx H can be obtained as a stable equilibrium for some payment function g(x H ). We now provide the design of a budget balanced payment scheme that incentivises any flow partition between the two paths (without considering IR, which will be dealt later).
Proposition 3: Assume BB but not necessarily IR, a total mass of users b ≤ 1, and any target equilibriumx H . The following side-payment function gx H (x H ) incentivisesx H :
Observe that at the target equilibriumx H , each user's total perceived cost (travel cost plus payment or minus subsidy) is equal tox H c H /b, independently of the path choice. Thus the equilibrium payoff of a type-i user is
Notice that the payment function (9) becomes (8) when x H =x H , which ensures thatx H is an equilibrium under the side-payment design in (9) . (9) also implies convergence from any x H to the stable targetx H :
• If x H >x H , the corresponding (9) is smaller than equilibrium payment in (8) , motivating more users to choose L-path with smaller penalty and x H decreases. (9) is larger than (8) (8), where each user is indifferent in choosing between the two paths, but this cost may not be covered by her information value and can drive her out of the system. Hence, besides Proposition 3, we need to consider IR in the side-payment design. We say that an equilibriumx H satisfies IR for any type-i user if,
In the following, we show that if users are homogeneous in their valuation types (i.e., θ 1 = θ 2 ), IR always holds when using Proposition 3; whereas if they are heterogeneous with θ 1 < θ 2 , IR does not hold in general. 1) Side-Payment for Homogeneous Users: Due to θ 1 = θ 2 in this subsection, the average valuation θ 0 equals θ 1 or θ 2 . To avoid trivial discussion, we assume the optimal social welfare at the flow maximizer x * H in (7) is nonnegative, i.e., (11) is non-negative. Thus, IR always holds for the homogeneous user case and according to Proposition 3 we can ideally choosex H = x * H in (7) to inentivise the social optimum. We denote by Po A g the Po A we can achieve using incentive payments.
Proposition 4: IR holds always for the homogeneous user case and we can use the the side-payment mechanism g(x H ) in (9) to incentivise the social optimum x * H in (7) . In this case Po A g = 1.
2) Side-Payment for Heterogeneous Users: Now we turn to a more general case with θ 1 < θ 2 and for simplicity of the analysis from now on we assume the users' proportions in both types are equal (η = 0.5). 7 This η = 0.5 value is assumed to be common knowledge, obtained in practice by obtaining users' type statistics. Then we have θ 0 = (θ 1 +θ 2 )/2 with θ 1 < θ 0 < θ 2 . In this heterogeneous case, SW (x * H ) ≥ 0 no longer guarantees IR at the desired x * H for the lower type-1 users, and we cannot apply Proposition 3 directly. The IR condition for type-1 is (see (11) 
indicating that if we like to keep type-1 users in the system we must restrict our targeted equilibria in the range [0, x I R ], which is the unique solution to (12) holding with equality. Fig. 2 plots the user-average information value θ 0 Q(x H , 1) and the type-1 user's information value θ 1 Q(x H , 1) as functions of x H , for a large and a small value of θ 1 values (we can choose any θ 1 < θ 0 and take θ 2 = 2θ 0 − θ 1 ). We observe that the social optimum x * H of the free optimisation problem (no IR consideration for type-1) is achieved when the gap between θ 0 Q(x H , 1) and total cost x H c H is maximized as in (7) . Whether we can achieve x * H in the constraint problem (with IR for type-1) depends on the value of θ 1 :
• When θ 1 is large (e.g., θ 1 = θ L 1 in Fig. 2) , the corresponding Fig. 2 , and 7 Our analysis and results can be easily extended to other values of η. IR is satisfied at the social optimum x * H . In this case we apply (9) to achieve SW (x * H ). • When θ 1 is small (e.g., θ 1 = θ S 1 in Fig. 2 ), we have Fig. 2 , and IR is not satisfied at the social optimum x * H . The best equilibrium decision x * H is to either operate the system at x S I R and ensure both types' IR (the so-called full participation case with b = 1), or to incentivise a flow x H > x S I R that maximises the efficiency in a system where only type-2 users participate (in the so-called half participation case with b = 0.5). How to maximize social welfare under our side-payment mechanism is now clear. First, we letx H be the solution to the free social welfare maximisation problem in the half participation case (only type-2 participate) with b = 0.5: Figure 3 shows the solutions to our three optimisation problems: the free optimisation problem, the case where only type-2 participate (half participation), and the best we can do if we insist in keeping both types in the system (full participation). By comparing the optimum social welfare we can achieve in these three cases we obtain the following procedure for choosing the equilibrium:
Theorem 1: In our heterogeneous user model, the equilibrium flow partitionx H and the resultant optimal social welfare SW g are chosen as follows:
• Social optimum: If x * H ≤ x I R , then we optimally choosê Fig. 3 ). Fig. 3 ). Fig. 3 ). By searching over all possible parameters and information value function Q 1 (·), the side-payment mechanism for two user types achieves Po A g = 1/2.
The proof is given in Appendix B.
Corollary 1: Under full information, Po A g = 1 when we use the side-payment mechanism.
Proof: When applying the side-payment mechanism, we choose g(x H ) = 0 for type-1 users and positive g(x H ) in (9) with b = 0.5 andx H = x * H in (7) for type-2 users. Given this side-payment scheme, one can check that at the unique equilibrium, all type-2 users of population nx * H will choose H-path and all the type-1 users will choose L-path. IR for type-1 users holds, and IR for type-2 users also holds because no matter which path a type-2 user chooses, her payoff is non-negative according to:
Thus, by the side-payment we can incentivise the social optimum x * H in (7) . The price of anarchy is thus 1 and the social welfare loss in Theorem 1 comes from the lack of information.
Unlike Po A g = 1 in the homogeneous case, here in the worst case our incentive mechanism can be as bad as the original system without incentives (as in Proposition 2). Intuitively, when users are diverse, we have to decide to selectively include less users (exclude low valuation users by raising the incentive payment) to achieve better path diversity, or to keep a larger number of users participating at the cost of path diversity (by lowering the incentive payment and hence weakening the incentives to use the H -path). In the half participation case (b = 0.5), we miss the low-valuation users' contribution. In the full participation case (b = 1), we reduce path diversity and mostly collect one-path information. If path diversity and full participation are both critical to achieving the optimal social welfare, we may lose half of the optimum as indicated by Theorem 1. In Section VI, we will choose Q 1 (·) as (1) and use extensive simulations to show that this mechanism is still efficient in most of the time.
It goes beyond the scope of this paper to discuss issues related to the form of the content function Q(x, 1). For instance, if our unit mass of users corresponds to a very large value n of actual users, even a small fraction x on a path can obtain a substantial amount of the total content and path diversity is important. If n is very small, we expect path diversity to play a less role, since these few users will discover new content even if they travel on the same path.
IV. CONTENT-RESTRICTION AS INCENTIVE
As we have already discussed, using side-payment as an incentive mechanism needs monetary transfer among users, which may not be possible in some applications. This motivates us to consider a payment-free incentive design: as a penalty to L-path participants, restrict the amount of content/information made available to them. Content restriction in the information sharing system can be done directly by making some information invisible or indirectly by offering a lower quality application service to the given user.
A. Content-Restriction Mechanism
To motivate more users to choose the H -path, the system planner provides a fraction a of the total information, i.e, a Q(x H , 1), to L-path participants, where a ∈ [0, 1] is the content restriction coefficient. For example, if we choose a = 1 (or 0), the system offers full (or zero) information to L-path participants.
Our content-restriction mechanism only depends on a user's path choice and is independent of her type. It satisfies the IC and IR requirements (since users can always take the L-path at zero cost, we have always full participation). Under the mechanism with coefficient a, a type-i user's payoff changes from (5) to
she will choose H -path. Otherwise, she will choose L-path.
As a decreases, we purposely "destruct" more shared information to L-path participants and condition (14) for choosing H -path is more likely to hold. 1) Content-Restriction for Homogeneous Users: Let us first consider the homogenous case with θ i = θ 0 for i = 1, 2. If we expect positive flows withx H ∈ (0, 1) on both paths at the equilibrium, all users should be indifferent in choosing between the two paths. Users' payoffs by choosing L-and H -path are equal, i.e.,
In Fig. 4 , we plot Q(x H , 1) as a function of x H and compare to the path decision threshold c H /((1−a)θ 0 ) in (15) . An intersection point (if any) of these two tells the equilibrium where the users are indifferent in choosing between the two paths. The threshold c H / ((1−a) θ 0 ) increases with a and can have at most two interaction points with Q(x H , 1). To fully characterize different intersection or equilibrium results, we define two non-negative thresholds for a:
Such thresholds help define the following three regimes:
• Strong content-restriction regime (0 ≤ a < a): When a is small and there is much content destruction as penalty to L-path participants, c H / ((1 − a) θ 0 ) is small and does not intersect with Q(x H , 1), and the only stable equilibrium is that all users choose H -path (i.e.,x H = 1). The social welfare is SW = θ 0 Q − c H which is the same for any a ∈ [0, a).
When a is medium, c H /(θ 0 (1 − a)) in Fig. 4 intersects with Q(x, 1) at two points that are equilibria: one is x H 0 ∈ (0.5, 1] and the other is 1 − x H 0 . We can show that only x H 0 is stable. 8 In this regime both paths offer the same payoffs to the users, hence each user obtains a payoff of θ 0 Q(x H 0 , 1)−c H . Figure 4 also shows that as a increases, x H 0 moves towards 0.5, and the corresponding social welfare θ 0 Q(x H 0 , 1) − c H increases towards the maximum θ 0 Q − c H . Note that x H = 0.5 is not a stable equilibrium, and hence we like to get arbitrarily close: choose a =ā − with infinitesimal > 0 to reach the social optimum SW = θ 0 Q − c H asymptotically. • Weak content-restriction regime (a ≤ a ≤ 1): When a is large, the only stable equilibrium is that all users choose L-path. The corresponding social welfare is SW = θ 0 a Q and it is maximised by deciding minimum destruction (a = 1). Strong or weak information destruction on L-path participants causes no path-diversity at the equilibrium. Only in 8 1 − x H 0 is not stable after some perturbation. For example, reducingx H slightly encourages more H -path participants to churn to L-path. Similarly, equilibrium x H 0 is stable: decrease fromx H encourages more L-path participants to churn to H -path, and increase fromx H encourages more H -path participants to churn to L-path.
the medium destruction regime we reach perfect pathdiversity (x H → 0.5) by choosing a = a − . When c H is small, the benefit gained due to path diversity in the medium destruction regime covers the efficiency loss due to content destruction. But when c H is large, content destruction and hence efficiency loss become very large if one likes to incentivise path-diversity, which motivates the use of a = 1.
Theorem 2: Let SW a be the maximum social welfare by applying the content-restriction.
• If the travel cost over H -path is small (i.e., c H < θ 0 (Q − Q)), we optimally choose a = a − to approach perfect path diversity (x H → 0.5) and optimum social welfare (SW a → θ 0 Q − c H ). • If the travel cost is large (c H ≥ θ 0 (Q − Q)), it is optimal to choose a = 1 since content destruction must be too excessive to incentivise path diversity. The corresponding social welfare is SW a = θ 0 Q By searching over all possible parameters and information value function Q 1 (·), the content-restriction mechanism for homogeneous users achieves Po A a = 1/2.
The proof is given in Appendix C. Using content-restriction as incentive, we either accept the original zero path-diversity equilibrium or perfect path-diversity in information collection. Unless c H is so high that we always prefer a zero diversity equilibrium, we can achieve perfect path-diversity by content restriction. Though this mechanism is not efficient when c H is large, we will see that user diversity helps improve it in the next subsection.
2) Content-Restriction for Heterogenous Users: Now we turn to the more general case with θ 1 < θ 2 and provide the main idea and key results. The detailed analysis can be found in [14] .
In this heterogeneous case, we search for an a ∈ [0, 1] to maximise social welfare at the equilibrium. If a is small or large, we only have zero path-diversity equilibria with eitherx H = 1 or 0. As long as the H -path cost c H is not too large, we should optimally choose a medium value of a to incentivise the perfect path-diversity equilibrium (x H = 0.5). Similar to the homogeneous case, when the travel cost c H is too high, we may not choose the path-diversity, as it is prohibitively expensive for any user type to cover the H -path. The following theorem shows how to design an a to achieve maximum social welfare. Let SW a denote the maximum social welfare achieved by our content-restriction mechanism by optimizing over a.
Theorem 3: When user types are diverse (i.e., θ 2 /θ 1 > Q/Q with Q and Q given in (16) and (17)), the optimal a * depends on c H :
• If the travel cost on H -path is small, i.e.,
we choose a * = (θ 2 Q −c H )/(θ 2 Q)− with infinitesimal > 0 to reach the perfect path-diversity (x H = 0.5) and social welfare,
• Otherwise, the travel cost on H -path is too high to send any user there (x H = 0), and we choose a * = 1 to avoid any content destruction. The corresponding social welfare is SW a = θ 0 Q. When user types are similar (i.e., θ 2 /θ 1 ≤ Q/Q), the choice of a * also depends on c H :
• If the travel cost on H -path is small (i.e., c H < θ 0 (Q − Q)), we optimally decide a * = (θ 1 Q − c H )/(θ 1 Q) to reach perfect path-diversity (x H = 0.5). The corresponding optimal social welfare is SW a = θ 0 Q − c H . • Otherwise, the travel cost on H -path is too high to send any user there (x H = 0) and we choose a * = 1 to avoid large content destruction. The corresponding social welfare is SW a = θ 0 Q. The resultant price of anarchy under the optimal contentrestriction mechanism is Po A a = 1/2.
A corollary is that diversity in the user types increases the optimum system efficiency. This is because type-2 users have a larger θ 2 than the average θ 0 and are more sensitive to the restriction on the content than the average user. Hence less restriction is needed to make users switch and obtain path diversity than in the case of homogeneous users. And this diversity is necessary to make this equilibrium unique. Of course user diversity does not play a role to improve efficiency if the cost c H is too large. In Section VI, we will choose Q 1 (·) as (1) and use extensive simulations to show that this mechanism is still efficient in most of the time.
V. COMBINED SIDE-PAYMENT AND
CONTENT-RESTRICTION FOR HETEROGENEOUS USERS In this section, we propose a combined mechanism: in addition to the payment function g(x H ) in Section III, we can also use content-restriction with coefficient a ≤ 1 in Section IV as follows.
A. Combined Mechanism
We collect from each L-path participant a payment g(x H ) for only a fraction a of the total information, i.e., a Q(x H , b), and give each H -path participant a subsidy (b−x H )g(x H )/x H to keep the budget balanced.
This combined mechanism jointly optimizes the payment function g(x H ) and restriction coefficient a. Depending on her path choice (H or L), a type-i user's payoff changes from (5) to
If we let a = 1 or g(x H ) = 0 for any x H , the combined mechanism is simplified to either side-payment or contentrestriction. This combined mechanism exploits the synergies of the two mechanisms. The use of side-payments reduces the effective cost difference of the two paths. This allows for less content destruction to be necessary for type-2 users to choose the H -path (i.e., we can obtain the desired path diversity in a more efficient way). Of course, since in this equilibrium type-1 users choose the L-path and must also pay the incentive fee, we have similar IR issues as we encountered before (see Section 3), but made more acute because the content is of lesser quality for users choosing the L-path. We need to consider if it is worthwhile to keep type-1 users in the system, or use a higher side payment and nicely control only type-2 users' choices with some a < 1. Actually, as long as c H is not too large, we can show that it is optimal to have a positive flow on every path. More specifically, we compare two possible equilibrium cases as follows:
(i) Case.IR1: this case ensures both user types' IR for full participation and only type-2 users are indifferent in path choosing. Thus, type-1 users must be better off in choosing the L-path and the resultant equilibriumx H ∈ [0, 0.5]. The optimal mechanism design in this case is to optimally choose the pair ofx H ∈ [0, 0.5] and a which maximize the social welfare and satisfy type-1's IR condition. Once such optimal parameters are determined, we can easily design a simple side-payment function to incentivise the target equilibrium. Yet the optimal pair ofx H and a are not easy to find since it is the solution to a non-convex optimization problem. As shown in [14] , we can still use some numerical methods for the calculation and we let (x H ,ǎ) denote the optimal pair of target equilibrium and content-restriction coefficient. The corresponding social welfare is SW (x H ,ǎ).
(ii) Case.IR2: this case excludes type-1 users by only satisfying type-2's IR due to side-payment. This is equivalent to the half participation case with b = 0.5 and a = 1 in Section 3. The optimal solution in this case isx H which is given by (13) and the corresponding social welfare is SW (x H ).
The combined mechanism is to compare SW (x H ,ǎ) in Case.IR1 and SW (x H ) in Case.IR2 to decide to incentivisě x H orx H as summarised in the following theorem.
Theorem 4: Depending on the relationship between social welfare SW (x H ,ǎ) and SW (x H ), we decide a, g(x H ) and which equilibriumx H to incentivise:
• Full participation: If SW (x H ,ǎ) ≥ SW (x H ), it is optimal to keep both types' IR and incentivisex H =x H by choosing a =ǎ and an appropriate side-payment function g(x H ). The corresponding social welfare is SW (x H ,ǎ). • Half participation: If SW (x H ,ǎ) < SW (x H ), it is optimal to satisfy only type-2's IR with b = 0.5 and incentivisê x H =x H by choosing a = 1 and g(x H ) in (9) . The corresponding social welfare is SW (x H ). Facing heterogeneous users, the combined mechanism performs significantly better than either the sidepayment or content-restriction mechanism, by increasing the price of anarchy Po A ag to more than 0.7 (i.e., Po A ag ≥ 0.7).
The proof is given in [14] .
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we use extensive simulations to show the performances of the side-payment and content-restriction mechanisms in the heterogeneous user case. 9 Recall that both these two mechanisms can be as bad as the original system without incentives, as we have Po A g = Po A a = 1/2 in the Fig. 5 . Ratio SW g /SW (x * H ) between the optimum SW value under the side-payment and the social optimum SW (x * H ). This ratio is larger than 70% globally. We set θ 0 = 0.5 and use Q 1 (x H ) from (1). We observe inefficiency when θ 1 decreases while c H remain at some moderately low value. Fig. 6 . Ratio SW a /SW (x * H ) between the optimum SW value under the content-restriction and the social optimum SW (x * H ). The ratio is larger than 60% globally. We set θ 0 = 0.5 and use Q 1 (x H ) in (1). worst case by choosing an arbitrary content function Q 1 (x H ). In the following, we reasonably specify Q 1 (x H ) as (1) and examine the performances by varying the other parameter values. Figure 5 compares the maximum social welfare achieved by the side-payment with the social optimum, by showing the ratio SW g /SW (x * H ) under different θ 1 and c H values. By fixing the average valuation θ 0 as 0.5, we can vary θ 1 value to change user diversity. We observe that as long as θ 1 is large with small gap with θ 2 , our side-payment mechanism can achieve the social optimum with SW g /SW (x * H ) = 100%. This explains this mechanism performs well when users are not diverse. Even when θ 1 is small, this mechanism is still efficient to achieve SW g /SW (x * H ) ≥ 70%. When c H is zero, users will automatically reach path-diversity and this ratio is 1 in Fig. 5 . When c H is too large, both this mechanism and the social optimum do not assign any user to explore the H -path. Thus, the ratio is also 1. Figure 6 compares the maximum social welfare achieved by the content-restriction with the social optimum, by showing Fig. 7 . Comparison between SW (x * H ), SW g and SW a under different values of θ 1 . We observe SW a > SW g for small θ 1 and SW a < SW g for large θ 1 . We set θ 0 = 0.5 and use Q 1 (x H ) in (1). Fig. 8 . There are K possible routes from s to t and all routes contain a common link from s to intermediary s which contains N 0 pieces of information. From s to t, users must select one among K possible links, denoted as P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P K . Each of these parallel links uniformly contains N/K pieces of information, keeping the total information constant. the ratio SW a /SW (x * H ) under different θ 1 and c H values. Unlike the side-payment, this mechanism performs well when θ 1 is small and users are diverse. Even when θ 1 is large, this mechanism is still efficient to achieve SW a /SW (x * H ) ≥ 60%. Similar to Fig. 5 , when c H is zero or very high, the ratio is 1 in Fig. 6 without any efficiency loss. Figure 7 shows the social welfare values achieved by the two mechanisms and compares to the social optimum. When c H is small (e.g., c H = 20 in Fig. 7) , we have SW a > SW g for small θ 1 ∈ [0, 0.042]. But when users are less diverse and θ 1 increases beyond 0.042, we have SW a < SW g . When θ 1 is large enough, SW g achieves the social optimum SW (x * H ).
VII. NETWORK MODEL GENERALIZATION Unlike our simple two-path model in Fig. 1 , people in practice may have more than two choices of routes if they would like to travel from one point to another. In addition, different routes may have some overlap with each other. In this section, we consider a more general network with K ≥ 3 parallel paths following a path overlap in Fig. 8, and 
A. General Network Model and Equilibrium Without Incentive Design
As shown in Fig. 8 , we consider K routes from s to t and all routes have a common link from s to intermediary s which contains N 0 pieces of information. As all users go through this common link, their collected information is
which is calculated as in (1) . Without much loss of generality, we assume traveling on the common link from s to s generates no cost. From s to t, users must select one out of K links, denoted as P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P K . Each of these parallel links uniformly contains N/K pieces of information. To keep the average travel cost over all K paths at c H /2, i.e., the same as in the prior two-path model, we set the cost over any path P k as
We summarize the unit mass of users' routing choices as non-negative flows (x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x K ) such that K k=1 x k = 1. Similar to (2) in the two-path model, we define the total information content collected and aggregated by the users from the K routes as Q(x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x K ), which is given by
where Q 1 (x k ) denotes the information content collected over a single link P k when a fraction x i of the users travel over that link. Similar to the specific Q 1 (·) function in (1) defined in Section II, now we have
We assume all users are of the same type (i.e., θ 1 = θ 2 = θ 0 ) for tractability of analysis. 10 Similar to (5) in Section II, here the payoff function of a homogeneous user by choosing path P k is
In the following, we similarly define the routing equilibrium (x 1 ,x 2 , · · · ,x K ) as in Definition 1. Definition 2: A feasible flow (x 1 ,x 2 , · · · ,x K ) in the content routing game is an equilibrium if no user traveling over any of the K paths will profit by deviating from her current path choice to increase her payoff.
The social welfare now becomes
and the social optimum flow (x * 1 , x * 2 · · · , x * K ) is to maximize (19).
Since path P 1 does not incur any cost (c 1 = 0), all users are better off by choosing path P 1 . We have the following result by generalizing Propositions 1 and 2 (where K = 2) via a similar proof analysis.
Proposition 5: There exists a unique equilibrium for the content routing game:x 1 = 1 andx 2 = · · · =x K = 0. The price of anarchy of the content routing game without incentive design is Po A = 1/K .
The equilibrium completely ignores the content on all other paths except path P 1 , leading to a low P O A = 1/K . As the path multiplicity K increases to infinity, the price of anarchy and social efficiency decrease to zero. Thus, mechanism design is more needed in a multi-path network. The path overlap does not make any difference because all users must travel through the overlapping path and collect the fixed content Q 0 . For illustration purpose and without much loss of generality, in the following mechanism design we focus on K = 3 and also explain the results for arbitrary K .
B. Side-Payment as Incentive
When applying side-payment to the multi-path model, we design individual side-payment functions g k (x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x K ) for participants over path P k with k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K }. Unlike payment function (9) in Proposition 3, now it is more complicated to design K many side-payment functions to incentivise the social welfare maximizer (x * 1 , x * 2 · · · , x * K ) as the equilibrium target, while maintaining the budget balanced. Moreover, given a user has more routing options to deviate from the existing choice, the stability of equilibrium is more difficult to prove even in the three-path network. In that respect we have introduced more sophisticated Lyapunov function techniques to ensure and prove the target equilibrium's asymptotic stability. This allows us to successfully design side-payment functions for the three paths which are shown in Proposition 6. For the more general case K > 3, similar approach applies.
Proposition 6: In a three-path network model with travel costs (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) = (0, c H /2, c H ), to incentivise users to choose paths P 2 and P 3 and converge from any initial flow to the social welfare maximizer (x * 1 , x * 2 , x * 3 ), we design side-payment functions on paths P 1 and P 2 as
(20) Note that as expected the side-payment on path P 1 is larger than that on P 2 (i.e., g 1 > g 2 ). This side-payment mechanism perfectly achieves price of anarchy Po A g = 1 without any loss of system efficiency.
The proof is given in Appendix D. With the help of the above side-payment mechanism, we greatly increase the P O A from 1/3 (Proposition 5) to 1. The path multiplicity does not change the side-payment's efficiency and Po A = 1 holds for arbitrary K .
C. Content-Restriction as Incentive
We now apply content-restriction to the multi-path network model. To motivate more users to choose the higher cost paths (P 2 , · · · , P K ) instead of zero cost P 1 , the system planner should only provide a fraction a k ∈ [0, 1] of the total information content to participants over the lower-cost path P k ∈ {P 1 , · · · , P K −1 }. As lower cost path participants need more incentives to change routes, we expect that a k increases with the path index k.
Unlike the two-path model in Section IV, more paths here imply more possible equilibria when under the contentrestriction mechanism. In addition, multiple paths may challenge the stability of the equilibria. We may obtain infinitely many equilibria but only a subset of them is stable. Still, we design Lyapunov function to ensure and prove that our content-restriction coefficients a k 's lead the user flow partition to the stable subset of equilibria (instead of a particular one), where each equilibrium in this stable set attains the same total system efficiency. In the following proposition, we design content-restriction coefficients for three-path case. For a more general case (K > 3), one can derive the content-restriction coefficients analogously although the analysis will be more tedious.
Proposition 7: The content-restriction operates differently according to the travel cost distribution:
with a 1 < a 2 to approach the path diversity equilibrium (x 1 ,x 2 ,x 3 ) = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) among the three paths, and the optimal social welfare is SW a → 3θ
to approach only the path diversity between path P 1 and path P 2 with equilibrium (x 1 ,x 2 ,x 3 ) = (1/2, 1/2, 0), and optimal social welfare is SW a → 2θ
, it is optimal to choose a 1 = a 2 = 1 and keep the zero path-diversity equilibrium, and the corresponding social welfare is θ 0 Q 1 (1) + θ 0 Q 0 . By searching over all possible parameters and information value function Q 1 (·), the mechanism achieves Po A a = 1/3.
The proof is given in [14] . It always hold that a 1 ≤ a 2 . This is consistent with our intuition that lower cost path participants need more incentives to change route for the social benefit. Similar to the two-path model in Section IV-A.1, in the worst case, the price of anarchy under content-restriction mechanism is the same as that without mechanism design. The key observation still holds here: unless c H is so high that we prefer a zero path-diversity equilibrium, we want to achieve perfect path-diversity between two paths or even among three paths by content restriction at manageable cost. For the case of K > 3, we also expect different levels of path diversity equilibrium and users are more uniformly partitioned across paths as cost c H decreases.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper studies the incentives of participation and route selection in information sharing system by combining information sharing with routing. We consider a content routing game where a unit mass of non-atomic selfish users choose between a high-cost and a low-cost path. To remedy the inefficient single path equilibrium of the content routing game, we design two incentive mechanisms to induce path diversity: side-payment and content-restriction. We show that both mechanisms achieve path diversity in routing choices at the cost of user participation or content destruction. We also show that user diversity can have opposite effects on the two mechanisms. We combine the above-mentioned two mechanisms and show that the resulting mechanism is much better than any of them used alone with Po A ag ≥ 0.7. Finally, we generalize the results in the previous sections by considering a more general network model and show that similar techniques can be used to derive the optimal incentive schemes.
There are some possible ways to extend this work. For example, we can add a traffic-dependent congestion cost to users' payoffs depending on their path choices and the traffic there, and investigate how the negative externalities due to traffic congestion will interplay with the positive externalities of information sharing to decide users' routing. In [14] we have shown that our mechanism design can be easily applied to a linear traffic-dependent cost model and all the main results including price of anarchy still hold.
Another possible generalization is that some users may value the information along one path differently than on the other path (say because they actually live near that path and may use this information more). Hence now a user type is defined by the value (θ H , θ L ) of the content valuation parameters along each of the paths. In this case the value of content becomes θ H Q 1 (x) + θ L Q 1 (1 − x) and it generalises the case we studied earlier where θ L = θ H . Our analysis and mechanism design can also be easily applied to this nonsymmetric case as shown in [14] .
Finally, it is also interesting to extend the one-shot routing game to a repeated game, where users repeat sensing trips over time and prior content may be useful later on. Some preliminary results are also shown in [14] .
APPENDIX A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Consider all possible information value function Q(·, 1) and parameters. Note that the maximal quantity of content is attained by letting half flow go through the high cost path and half go through the low cost path, hence
{θ 0 Q(x H , 1)} = θ 0 Q(0.5, 1).
Thus the price of anarchy is lower-bounded as follows:
We next show that the bound is tight. Define Q 1 (x) by (21), and consider any fixed value of c H that is less than 2θ 0 q. We consider what happens as θ 1 → 0. One can easily check the following:
1. The free social optimum: The optimum is attained for This completes the proof.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Consider an arbitrary concave information value function Q(·, 1). In the medium content-restriction regime, we have shown that the maximal social welfare attained at a stable path-diversity equilibrium (0 <x H < 1) is θ 0 Q − c H which is reached asymptotically. In the strong and weak content-restriction regime, we can infer that the maximal social welfare attained at a stable zero path-diversity equilibrium (x H = 0 or 1) is θ 0 Q. Thus when c H < θ 0 (Q − Q), we have θ 0 Q − c H > θ 0 Q.
Then we optimally choose a = a− 11 to approach perfect path diversity (x H → 0.5) and optimum social welfare SW a → θ 0 Q − c H . When c H ≥ θ 0 (Q − Q), we have
Then we optimally choose a = 1 to reach optimum social welfare SW a = θ 0 Q.
Next we prove Po A a = 1/2. Consider all possible information value function Q(·, 1) and parameters. We denote the set of all the equilibria when we apply content restriction with coefficient a by N E(a), for example, N E(1) = {0} means when a = 1 there exists only one equilibrium which is all users choose the low cost path. Based on this notation we have
We claim that among all the equilibria the full contentpreserving equilibrium a = 1 maximises the worst case equilibrium for all values of c H . Now we prove our claim. When a = 1,x H = 0 is the unique equilibrium and the corresponding social welfare is θ 0 Q. Assume that for some other a , the worse equilibrium has efficiency higher than that. Then this equilibrium must be either one where users are indifferent between the two paths, or one where all users choose the same path. In the first case, we know that there is a second equilibrium where customers select the the low cost path with efficiency a θ 0 Q and this must be superior to the one where users are indifferent. But leads to contradiction since it would imply a θ 0 Q > θ 0 Q while a < 1. Suppose that the best equilibrium corresponds to users not being indifferent. But then for all values of 0 ≤ a ≤ 1 this cannot be superior to the one with a = 1 we proposed. We just proved that max We next show that the bound is tight. Define Q 1 (x) by (21), and consider any fixed value of c H that is less than 2θ 0 q. The Po A a for this specific instance becomes
Therefore, Po A a = 1/2.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
To enforce BB, the money we refund to each path participant over path P 3 is, dynamical system, we only need to prove C(·) is monotone.
